Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

SOCIETIES

FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE Western Philosophical Association held its fifth annual meeting on Friday and Saturday, April 21 and 22, at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. Five regular sessions were held, besides several happily arranged social gatherings for which the association was indebted to the hospitality of the faculty of the philosophical and psychological departments of the University of Nebraska. Seventeen members were in attendance. Pains having been taken not to overcrowd the program with formal papers, it was possible, in such a relatively small gathering of specialists, to have a full, vigorous and fairly general discussion of nearly all the topics presented, and to get the stimulating effect of genuine philosophical debate. The address of the retiring president on 'Psychology and Education' was delivered on Friday evening at a largely attended public session. At the business session, it was voted that the regular meetings continue to be held during or near the time of the Easter recess; this will prevent the association from joining, in its collective capacity, in the proposed meetings at Cambridge next winter. Invitations for the next meeting were received from the University of Kansas and from Washington University; the selection of a place was left to the executive committee. Six new members were elected: Mr. H. G. Campbell, Professor C. W. Fordyce, Professor Frank P. Graves, Professor A. E. Monin, Professor J. L. Merriam, Professor J. D. Stoops. Officers for the next year were elected as follows: President, Professor J. H. Tufts; vice-president, Professor F. C. French; secretary-treasurer, Professor A. O. Lovejoy; additional members of the executive committee, Professor W. B. Pillsbury, Professor A. Ross Hill. Abstracts of papers are appended.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY,
Secretary.

The Concept of Time: JOHN E. BOODIN.

Kant was the first philosopher to see the epistemological importance of time and space. Time, however, while less amenable to logical pyrotechnics than space, is epistemologically more fundamental, because while contents in space are reversible or interchangeable, which means that space does not affect them intrinsically, time makes it impossible to take our contents more than once or makes a difference to the contents themselves. To define time means precisely to show what that difference is. To define a concept, namely, is to give its genus and differentia. In the case of space, for example, series or manifold may be regarded as the genus, in which case extensive series or extensive manifold would mark space off from other series concepts. But what about time? If we consider time as a series, what are its differentiæ? The answer would be: The time series is a series in which contents keep passing out and coming in and in which no position can be defined with reference to any other position, because every position is shifting in value with reference to every other. But this is to contradict the fundamental nature of the series concept. Series, then, is not the proximate genus of time. The only universe of discourse we can have for a definition of time is experience or reality. Time is that aspect of experience which makes it both possible and necessary to make different judgments with reference to the same point of reality and with reference to the same attribute or within the same universe of discourse. It thus saves the law of contradiction by furnishing a new dimension by means of which incompatible judgments can occupy the same space without destroying each other. Time, unlike the positive characters of reality, can only be defined through its other; it can not be pointed to. But the peculiar transformation of that other is due to its individual character and its place in the system of positive values. Time is an absolute property in the sense that it is ultimately real, *i. e.*, can not be derived from any form of positive being. It, on the contrary, makes all positive being relative.

Time as an Absolute Principle of Negativity: E. L. HINMAN.

This paper, prepared to open a discussion of Professor Boodin's monograph on 'Time and Reality,' criticized the argument of the monograph from the standpoint of absolute idealism. Four main points were urged. In the first place, any attempt to define time presupposes that time is a member within a larger whole, and is relative to a principle or system which transcends time. The conditions of the logic of definition, then, render futile any effort to define time as an ultimate principle which conditions everything, and the effort leads and must lead to a hollow and empty result. In the second place, the logic by which the monograph infers the ultimateness of time might be used with at least equal cogency in the contrary direction; with greater cogency, if we take account of the fact that the timeless must be admitted in some form in any case. In the third place, the central principle of absolute idealism, the ontological significance of the concept, is the vitalizing principle of the entire argument, and should be followed to its conclusion, but is not consistently worked out. In the fourth place, the author of the monograph, shunning the logical development of absolute idealism, has hypostatized absolute non-being. The result is a conception contradictory in itself, and bearing the germs of impossible logical demands.

The Category of the Unknowable: DAVID F. SWENSON.

The unknowable is an important concept, which in some form or other has engaged the attention of most medieval and modern philosophers. The doctrine of H. Spencer is an adaptation of Sir W. Hamilton's position, and this in its turn goes back to Kant for its primary impulse. It is in Hamilton also intimately connected with a distinction between knowledge and belief which was first clearly laid down by Aristotle. The concept of the unknown covers that of the unknowable, but is not identical with it. All that is unknowable is unknown, but not all that is unknown is unknowable. The unknowable is the concept of the unknown pushed to its absolute limit. The unknown is a category having significance for both theory and practice. In each realm, however, the significance is a different one, immediately at least, if not ultimately. In the field of theoretical knowledge it means that science is progressive, not stationary. Since knowledge is essentially systematic, it also means that accepted theory must always be held subject to modification and reorganization. As long as there is anything unknown, every science which does not abstract from its relation to the reality which unfolds itself in space and time (excepting such sciences as have no other relation to concrete reality than that involved in the derivation of their presuppositions from experience), must remain hypothetical in nature, not necessarily in respect of the individual facts on which it rests, but in respect of its interpretations, and ultimate concrete organization. Such sciences being hypothetical, the only test of validity actually applicable to them is workableness, including in that term ease and economy of thought. And as long as there is anything unknown or unfinished, a synthetic philosophy which shall systematically embrace the whole of reality, is rendered impossible. The unknowable is that which can not be known. Knowledge of the unknowable would involve self-transcendence. When knowledge is looked upon as a transforming rather than as a revealing function, the object of knowledge becomes an unknowable 'Ding-an-sich.' As so conceived it is without significance. There is a confusion of thought in identifying such an object with the sensory stimulus, which is of course either known or knowable. In Herbert Spencer the unknowable is, among other things, that which can not be intuitively represented in thought with absolute completeness. Not only the concepts mentioned by him, but every individual object as such, is in this sense unknowable. Every totality involves the infinite. Every object involves in itself an infinity of possible sensible experiences, and involves, in its relations, an infinity of possible and actual connections with other objects. We can thus never know what an object is all in all; that would indeed be to know 'what God and man is.' The totality of an individual object as such, as well as the totality of things as actual, exists only for the will. We apprehend reality in belief. Knowledge is the instrument by means of which the will comes into intelligent relation with external reality. Knowledge is of what a thing is; belief, that it is. This is parallel to the old Aristotelian distinctions: *ὅτι ἐστι — διότι ἐστι*; *πρῶται οὐσίαι — δεύτεραι οὐσίαι*; form with matter—form without matter.

The Relation of Psychology to the Philosophy of Religion: F. C. FRENCH.

As physics brings all unusual and apparently abnormal phenomena of nature under natural law, so modern psychology brings all abnormal mental phenomena (hallucinations, trances, etc.) under the ordinary normal laws of our psychophysical life. The doctrine of the subliminal self in psychology plays much the same part as the theory of potential energy, or the invisible ether in physics. As Professor James points out in his 'Varieties of Religious Experience,' by means of the subliminal self the psychologist can explain sudden conversions, celestial visions and mystic ecstasies. The subject of such experiences, coming as they do from the hidden region of the subconscious, very naturally ascribes them to a supernatural source. The old psychology was compelled either to deny the very fact of these experiences or to accept the supernatural inference. Modern psychology accepts these experiences as subjective facts, but denies their ontological significance. Professor James departs from the standpoint of science when he suggests that these phenomena of the religious consciousness may be doorways into the spiritual world. Whatever metaphysics or epistemology may say of such a view, psychology as a science must regard these religious experiences as purely phenomenal. It does not find in them any manifestation of the transcendent, although their possessors often so interpret them. Science is as rigorously phenomenalistic in the mental sphere as in the physical sphere. For the scientific mind there is no more possibility of a subjective miracle than of an objective miracle. Many religiously minded people have been led by the physical sciences to give up the notion of supernatural manifestations in nature, but have still regarded certain religious experiences as having a transcendent value. This raises for the philosophy of religion the problem: if the mental realm be as phenomenal as the physical, have we any ground for a belief in the transcendent? The answer in brief is that we have no perceptual evidence of the transcendent either in the physical or in the mental realm, but the fact that our experience, both outer and inner, is intelligible, subject to law and to scientific interpretation, is the best evidence that our world is the work of mind. We do not see the transcendent through gaps in the empirical; we know the transcendent through the very rationality of the empirical. This line of thought, of course, has nothing to do with the psychological causes of religious belief, but simply with the philosophical justification of such a belief.

The Esthetic Attitude: ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN.

The esthetic attitude is a state of contemplation distinguishable by its conformity. Affection is a certain aspect of the total conscious state and, as referred to an object or group of objects within the complex, is expressed by a conformity or non-conformity of this to the whole. Aside from the attentive apperceptive state which is uppermost, one must take into consideration 'subconscious' functionings of the *Bewusstseinslage* which are important in determining this conformity or non-conformity. Pleasure is an expression for active healthy functioning of the organism. It is also an expression for a conformable mental whole in which neither active physical nor mental processes having a definite purpose strike the dominant note. An objectifying and justification of the concrete state itself characterize this esthetic pleasure. Art has its significance in providing objects which arouse conformable mental states of this sort. But the esthetic attitude is not limited to works of art. It may be adopted toward any situation in life, and therein rests its great significance to the thinking man. It depends, then, in its broadest scope, on a certain clear, sane world-view which sublimates all. It thus detects the ideal essence in all, the logic to every situation. Thus it is that even sorrow and pain, which as active functionings are unpleasant processes, possess, no less, esthetic elements which, when made dominant, bring peace and calm and have an elevating intent. There is no esthetic displeasure, properly speaking. The esthetic means conformity, and non-conformity always prompts desire for action or thought-process, which in its nature is unesthetic. The ugly in art finds its justification as a motive for a certain quality of affection which the genius of the artist raises above its practical distasteful significance into the realm of the esthetic. Esthetic objects may be of three sorts: (1) sensation complexes, a low order because lacking in fullness and permanent interest; (2) humorous situations conformable in their mere natures because all earnest and purposeful intent has been extraneously removed; and (3) any complex from which one can derive a complete and ideal satisfaction without further desire or purpose.

The Meaning of Right: F. C. SHARP.

The assumption upon which this paper rests is that approbation and disapprobation are the ultimate source of moral distinctions. Its problem is a determination of the meaning of the words right and wrong in accordance with this assumption. On this view right would mean generically the approved, but it applies to but one of the many things that are objects of approbation. Right is a term which I apply only to volitions, and only to such volitions as I approve of every one having under the given conditions. A consideration of three obvious objections to this view will make the position clearer. It will be urged that there are judgments of propriety and decency which are not moral judgments, which nevertheless seem to fall under our definition. But it is denied that they do so, on the ground that they are judgments not upon what the person aims to do, but upon a by-product of his aim or purpose. It will be further objected that our fundamental assumption makes moral distinctions purely subjective. It is admitted that this objection would be a serious one if substantiated; but it is claimed that the right, objectively considered, is not that which any one whatever chances to approve, but is the approval of a completely developed man, acquainted with all the relevant facts of the situation. Finally it will seem to many that our definition omits the fundamental ethical category, that of obligation. The attempt is made to meet this objection by showing that the feeling of obligation is definable as approbation qualified by the feeling of shrinking from the disagreeable.

Some Inconsistencies in the Modern Theory of the Judgment: W. B. PILLSBURY.

The inconsistency upon which most emphasis was placed lies in defining judgment as the ascription of reality to the given, and then retaining as judgment the proposition of formal logic under the assumption that the subject is the given whose reality is predicated. It was contended first that there is nowhere in consciousness a mere given, but that everything conscious, qua conscious, must have meaning. Consequently the psychological correlate of the judgment is the act of attention, while in the proposition there is essentially and always, two acts of attention, two judgments in the meaning of the definition. The only possible reason for regarding the proposition as a judgment under the modern definition is that at the moment of speaking the subject is often relatively unimportant because the product of an earlier judgment, or that in consciousness there has been no subject, but that it has been introduced in speech as an after-thought. It is proposed to restrict the term judgment to the interjectional, the impersonal and perhaps the demonstrative judgments of current usage, and to designate by inference the mental process which lies behind the two-term proposition of formal logic. This second suggestion is favored by the growing tendency to regard the conclusion as the only vital part of the syllogism, and to regard the premises as at most tests of truth rather than as antecedent conditions for the attainment of the conclusion.

The Effect of Incentives on Work: W. R. WRIGHT, reported by W. B. PILLSBURY.

Experiments with the ergograph showed that not only do such incentives as working down to a line or block that limits the extent of movement make possible a greater amount of work than can be done without such incentive (*i. e.*, when the hand moves in the ergograph without having any definite object or point to reach), but also that work performed under the influence of definite incentive is less fatiguing than the same amount of work without incentive.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Hume: The Relation of the Treatise of Human Nature (Book I.) to the Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. W. B. ELKIN. New York, The Macmillan Co. 1904. Pp. ix + 330.

While the aim of this book—an elaboration of an earlier dissertation—is, in the writer's own words, 'to clear up the obscurity regarding Hume's exact position in his two chief philosophical works,' and, consequently, a large part of the work is made up of textual analysis and comparison, the more ultimate purpose is clearly to contribute to a more adequate conception of Hume's place in the history of philosophy which the writer feels has been 'inadequate and defective.' To this clarification (needed perhaps as much in the case of Hume as in that of Kant) the author has contributed both positively and negatively; positively, in that through this comparative study the essentials of both works (which are described as positivism in epistemology, scepticism in metaphysics and agnosticism in religion) clearly emerge; and negatively, in that he disposes of the misconception, leading inevitably to confusion in regard to Hume's position, that the two works represent different standpoints.

The source of this inadequate conception the writer finds in the assumption that the 'Inquiry,' representing the more mature view of the author, should be taken as a basis for the estimation of Hume's position,